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 Abstract—Cloud computing is a paradigm for computing 
services that are delivered to users over the Internet. In cloud 
computing, users rent rather than buy their computing resources. 
Cloud computing likely represents the next stage in the evolution 
of the Internet. But the cloud computing paradigm is still 
developing, with numerous unknowns and many questions open 
for research. One critical question that has not received much 
attention is security. A significant subset is digital forensics—
that is, (1) the discovery of evidence remaining on a computer 
after a security breach or attack and (2) the use of that evidence 
to investigate the event and establish facts for use in legal 
proceedings.
This paper discusses the impact that cloud computing 
will have on digital forensics. From a forensic perspective, 
cloud computing raises a number of concerns. Most immediate 
is whether or not forensic practitioners will be able to analyze 
the Cloud using existing techniques of digital forensics. During 
a traditional forensic examination, files on the storage media are 
examined along with the entire file system structure. But this may 
not be a practical model for examinations in the Cloud, where 
the computer is virtual, that is, where numerous heterogeneous 
resources, often geographically distributed, are combined. Other 
concerns include protecting evidence against contamination 
and anticipating the legal issues that will be raised by the Cloud 
paradigm, with its resources spread over diverse administrative 
and geopolitical domains. Comprehensive security services to 
protect not only the Cloud’s resources but also the data that 
resides on them may need to be instituted. The open literature to 
date has yet to address any of these challenges.
Cloud technologies are predicted to cause a paradigm shift 
in digital forensic techniques. This paper discusses the application 
of traditional digital forensic examinations to cloud forensics.
Keywords—Cloud Computing, Digital Forensics, Computer 
Forensics
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper will differentiate between two computing 
paradigms—traditional computing and cloud computing. 
Traditional computing describes a user at a desktop 
workstation where data storage, applications, and computing 
resources reside locally. Cloud computing describes a user 
at a workstation or terminal connected to shared computing 
resources (applications, data, storage) that are accessible 
over the Internet. The resources can be widely distributed, 
and the cloud computing services can expand or contract on 
demand. The separate pieces that comprise cloud computing 
are integrated and managed for the user through an interface 
known as a virtual machine monitor, or hypervisor.
Cloud computing represents an expansion of 
today’s computing environment into a virtual computing 
infrastructure—an expansion from networked desktop PCs 
to a paradigm where Cloud providers manage computational 
resources for multiple users who simultaneously run 
applications, solve computational problems, and store data. 
Cloud users rent rather than own the resources. Computing 
services are sold like a utility: Usage is metered and users pay 
for what they use. The Internet serves as the distribution grid 
and, to an extent, the computing platform.
The Cloud’s primary benefits include its ability to
• create a centralized point for monitoring computer 
security posture and state of health
• move the management, usage, and maintenance 
from local hardware/software to an infrastructure 
that is accessed, maintained, and used from a 
network.
The Current State of Cloud Computing
For this paper we will define cloud computing as a 
shared pool of computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, 
storage, applications, and services) made available to users on 
demand through a network. These resources can be rapidly 
provisioned and released by the provider with minimal 
interaction. Because hardware is shared across multiple 
application instances, the network must be able to handle 
applications migrating from hardware to hardware, and must 
be configured to deal with such change without requiring 
human intervention.
Although cloud providers will face the challenge of 
delivering transparent services to the users of massive “server 
farms,” the promise of a cost savings model that provides 
near limitless capabilities and accessibility to the end user is 
attractive for industry. 
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Already some statistical and mathematical industries 
as well as commercial and government entities have begun 
adopting public and private clouds. (Public clouds use the 
Internet. Private clouds emulate cloud computing, but on 
private networks.) The industry is beginning to understand 
the concepts of hosting applications and infrastructures and 
learning how to make the Cloud profitable [1]. As cloud 
computing has become increasingly mature and coherent, a 
few businesses have emerged as leaders in the technology. 
They include Microsoft, Google, and IBM. By showing their 
support through the promotion, encouragement, adoption, and 
leadership of cloud computing, the larger providers have built 
a foundation for the paradigm shifts of recent years. As the 
Cloud becomes more pervasive, the paradigm will continue 
to evolve. [2] 
The promise of cloud computing has spurred 
entrepreneurial development of cloud services. A recent article 
lists 150 companies in its yearly roundup of cloud computing 
participants.1 The services provided by these businesses are 
generally divided into three categories: (1) Infrastructure as 
a Service, (2) Platform as a Service, and (3) Software as a 
Service.
The subject of this paper, digital forensics, will be 
relevant to the infrastructure component, known by the 
acronym IaaS.
2. DIgITal FOReNsICs
Like cloud computing, the field of digital forensics is 
still in its infancy. The science of digital forensics has been 
described as “the process of identifying, preserving, analyzing, 
and presenting digital evidence in a manner that is legally 
accepted” [5]. Digital forensics includes both investigative 
and analytical techniques. Informally, digital forensics is 
defined as “the collection of techniques and tools used to find 
evidence in a computer.”2
Digital forensics is a subset of computer security. It is 
the act of collecting evidence after an attack and analyzing that 
evidence to locate and convict an attacker. Digital forensics is 
complicated by the fact that successful attackers know how 
to cover their trails and that unsuccessful attacks often pass 
unnoticed.
Digital forensics is considered a science because it is a 
systematic, technological inspection of a computer system and 
its contents. Its aim is to locate and preserve electronic evidence 
for use in criminal investigations. Digital forensic investigation 
requires a level of expertise and rigorous methodology that 
exceeds standard data harvesting and preservation routinely 
performed by system support personnel.
The question is: Can we analyze the Cloud using 
the established tools and techniques of digital forensics? 
The Cloud infrastructure—with its distributed processing, 
storage, and resources—can be extremely complex because 
storage capacities can grow geometrically. From a forensic 
perspective this raises new questions. Before understanding 
the applicability of current digital forensics practices to the 
Cloud, we must construct a common understanding of what 
digital forensics entails.
Practitioners have attempted to provide some 
formalization to the field by defining a five-phase process: 
identification, acquisition, preservation, analysis, and 
reporting of the evidence. These phases describe a standard 
forensic practice that we will follow and use to organize this 
paper. This standard unifies many of the previous forensic 
protocols and provides an abstraction to the process that is not 
focused on a particular tool or technology, nor is it bound to a 
specific class of cyber crimes. Within the field of forensics are 
a variety of sub-domains, but they will not be addressed in this 
paper. Our purpose is rather to examine the larger conceptual 
issues that will arise in the new cloud paradigm.
Cloud Dynamics Issues
The notion of data acquisition changes when using 
virtual machines on the Cloud. No longer are we acquiring 
an operating system residing on a physical device. 
Consequently, it may not be feasible to physically protect 
against contamination of the machine through a write-blocker. 
In the traditional computing paradigm, the analyst physically 
removes the drive and takes it to a designated location to create 
a bit-to-bit image of the device—a copy on which to perform 
analyses. In the Cloud, analysts may be bound to the network 
where the virtual machine resides. If the network experiences 
a failure, it is no longer possible to conduct an investigation. 
Consequently, investigations will be more dependent on the 
surrounding infrastructure than on physical machines in the 
traditional paradigm.
During the experiment, a number of acquisition 
hypotheticals arose for which the test team did not have any 
definitive answers:
• What if a machine is located in location X and 
the examiner is in location Y and is attempting an 
acquisition of the device when the physical network 
interface card goes down?
• What will happen if the network cards fail on the 
server that contains the local data store with the 
virtual machine? If the analysts need to remove the 
drives, they must acquire the entire device in order to 
acquire the image that they were looking for, which 
will entail an increased amount of processing time. 
Additionally, analysts face legal implications with 
regards to other users’ data that might be acquired. 
How are warrants handled in this situation?
• The notion of forensically sound images will be 
brought into question. What will the source image be 
in this case? Will the commercial service providers 
need to store the image on their systems until the 
case is closed, to ensure that it is indeed the genuine 
1 
2 Caloyannides, Michael A. Computer Forensics and Privacy. Boston: Artech 
House, 2001. 
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image? (If so, the examiner will be dependent on the 
backup strategies of the service provider.) Or will a 
hash of the virtual machine in question be enough to 
satisfy the requirement of producing source evidence 
in a court of law?
Despite these unknowns, however, there is a possible 
benefit regarding the business impact of digital forensics on 
the Cloud. Previously, many organizations would not bring 
down servers after an intrusion or event due to the financial 
implications. With the advent of cloud forensics, that is, live 
forensics, that situation may change.
Virtual Hardware Issues 
The introduction of virtual hardware into the digital 
forensics investigation environment is a complex issue with 
both benefits and drawbacks. The abilities to “snapshot” a 
virtual machine and to preserve the contents of memory, as well 
as the entire state of the machine, are quite useful. However, 
the snapshot is a mixed blessing that opens a multitude of new 
and uncharted issues. 
There is also the issue of virtual disks and CDs in 
products such as VMware’s ESX, a virtual machine monitor 
or hypervisor. These devices can operate just like the physical 
addition of a hard drive to a machine. Users can specify the size 
and type of drive (such as IDE or SCSI), among other features. 
From the operating system, it would appear as though a new 
physical drive appeared on the device. However, if one were 
to snapshot and add a drive, then revert to the snapshot without 
the drive, there would be no evidence from the operating 
system that a secondary storage device ever existed. This is 
a sophisticated method for ensuring data are obfuscated on 
the Cloud. The notion of file carving, the location of deleted 
virtual partitions on the physical disk, and the amount of time 
they would reside there before the space would be reclaimed 
by a new virtual machine, are all new questions that will 
remain unanswered until more research is conducted.
Additionally, the ephemeral nature of cloud computing 
raises many issues regarding the lifetime of a particular device 
because the lifetime is no longer years or months; rather it 
is weeks at best. Storage needs grow as the Cloud grows. 
The storage issues are one of the greatest challenges of cloud 
computing. As demand for resources increases, the cloud 
provider’s ability to store all of a particular users’ information 
for weeks, or even months, becomes economically unfeasible. 
As space is reclaimed, forensic evidence is lost.
3. expeRIMeNTal sCOpe
This section will focus on the potential to leverage some 
of the Cloud’s capabilities to create an advantage for forensic 
analysts.
The cloud computing environment includes three 
primary elements: platforms, software, and infrastructure. All 
three are configured and delivered as services. In this paper, 
and in our experiments, we limited our work to that part of 
the cloud relevant to digital forensics—the infrastructure. 
But note that the cloud infrastructure is virtual, not tangible. 
Cloud infrastructure is organized to ensure scalability and 
make efficient use of resources, not to facilitate forensic 
investigations. In the Cloud, infrastructure is configured with 
numerous separate components that can reside anywhere on 
the cloud provider’s network. Consequently, forensic evidence 
might be widely dispersed over many devices and domains.
The cloud paradigm benefits users but complicates 
matters for forensic investigators. Cloud technologies will 
force a shift from traditional forensic techniques.
In the near term, the forensic process in the Cloud is 
likely to rely on the examiner’s knowledge of the technical 
aspects of the specimen and an understanding of the case and 
the law. 
In the longer term, the success of a forensic examination 
will be strongly dependent on how the Cloud is finally 
deployed.
Fortunately the Cloud infrastructures have certain 
common attributes.
• Computing infrastructure are standardized and 
scalable
• User focus on the usage of the Cloud
• Cloud provider takes care of keeping it running
• Self-service based usage model
• Users manage their own application
• Minimal or self-managed platform
• Infrastructure doesn’t require a lot of care and feeding 
to keep running.
These attributes provided a starting point for developing 
a set of cloud forensics experiments. To conduct those 
experiments, we needed to build a cloud environment and 
select cloud management software to operate it.
Selection of Cloud Management Product
An analysis of the cloud computing market revealed 
that the VMware vSphere suite of products (described in the 
following section) has been adopted by numerous Fortune 
500 companies as well as government customers. These high 
acceptance rates suggest that industry and government will 
be using vSphere (and other VMware products) in numerous 
venues.3 Thus, analyzing this product will potently yield far-
reaching effects. As a result, the researchers in this study chose 
3 Bruzzese, J. Peter. “The Hypervisor Wars,” Infoworld, 9 September 2009. 
According to IDC’s Worldwide Quarterly Server Virtualization Tracker, the 
majority of IT shops using virtualization are working with VMware products. 
(http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?sessionId=&containerId=219011)
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vSphere to be the model by which to analyze all the problems. 
However, all the problems and conclusions which are drawn 
should ideally be tools/technology agnostic. 
The following reasons formed the basis for the choice:
• Ease of acquisition
• VMware offers free 30-day trials on all the software 
components needed to build a cloud computer
• VMware is well-known and has been one of the 
market leaders in virtualization; therefore, many 
resources are available for this product.
• Ease of use: Many blogs and much documentation 
exist to aid in resolving problems with building and 
maintaining the vSphere cloud computer.
Product Description
vSphere is a suite of products that enables a virtual 
infrastructure. The vSphere virtualization stack was released on 
21 May 2009 by VMware of Palo Alto, CA. The manufacturer 
promotes vSphere as a datacenter virtualization platform. 
vSphere manages collections of infrastructure (e.g., CPUs, 
storage, and networking) as a pool of resources to call on in order 
to complete jobs—similar to the performance of commercial 
operating systems that take the pool of local resources (CPU, 
memory, storage, networking) and manage them as a single 
entity. vSphere falls under the IaaS paradigm.
vSphere Components
The vSphere hypervisor, known as ESX, allows multiple 
operating systems to share a single hardware host. This 
virtualization layer runs on physical servers that abstract the 
various resources (processor, memory, storage) into multiple 
virtual machines. Two versions of ESX are available: ESX and 
ESXi. The former is an enterprise-level product. The latter is 
a streamlined, free version of the product.
Important features of the vSphere stack include the 
following:
• VMware ESX 4.0 contains a built-in service console. 
It is available as an installable CD-ROM boot 
image.
• VMware ESXi 4.0 does not contain a service console. 
It is available in two forms: (1) VMware ESXi 4.0 
Embedded and (2) VMware ESXi 4.0 Installable. 
ESXi 4.0 Embedded is firmware that is built into a 
server’s physical hardware. ESXi 4.0 Installable is 
software that is available as a CD-ROM boot image. 
Users install the ESXi 4.0 Installable software onto a 
server’s hard drive.
• VMware vCenter Server is the central point for 
configuring, provisioning, and managing virtualized 
IT environments.
VMware vSphere Client is an interface that allows users 
to connect remotely to vCenter Server or ESX/ESXi from any 
Windows PC.
4. expeRIMeNTs
To test the vSphere product, we devised a series of 
experiments. Our experiments were conducted across several 
different machines with differing architectures in order to 
evaluate vSphere on a variety of platforms. The experiments 
during this study were conducted entirely on a private, stand-
alone cloud. 
Additionally, we hoped the ability to run vSphere on 
heterogeneous pieces of equipment with different memories, 
computational powers, and disk space would demonstrate the 
potential for heterogeneity in the cloud environment.
We also used various versions of the VMware software 
to determine scalability and backward-compatibility within 
the ESX/ESXi product line.
Experiment Topology
Several difficulties were encountered in setting up 
the environment, particularly related to the hardware 
specifications for vSphere. Previously, all VMware products 
(ESX/ESXI 3.0, 3.5 u1 – u4), even the most recent release 
3.5 u4 issued in March 2009, had been installable on 32-bit 
hardware. In prior versions of ESX, 32-bit hardware was 
supported in “legacy” mode. However, after the release of 
vSphere, support for 32-bit hardware dropped and only 64-bit 
hardware was supported.
Additionally, there was a need to have the Intel-VT 
chipset for vSphere to install properly on the various machines. 
Numerous different techniques were attempted to enable 
ESX/i 4.0 support for 32-bit hardware, ranging from changing 
parts of the installer to upgrading from an ESX3.5 machine to 
ESX4.0, with no success.
After supported hardware was used, the installation and 
configuration of both ESX and ESXi was quite straightforward. 
Because ESXi (the free version of ESX) has a reduced 
functionality, the installation walked through everything and 
worked quite well. However, because of the heterogeneity 
of our environment, some of the core features (such as HA) 
didn’t work well in non-uniform environments. As such, many 
of the add-on packages were not utilized.
Some seemingly random issues were encountered while 
conducting the experiments:
• The clients would lock-up or become unresponsive 
after some use. The problems were not apparently 
deterministic (in terms of the activities or the 
applications that were running).
• Users could not access the virtual machines or we 
were unable to power ON/OFF or edit the virtual 
machine settings.
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These problems were mostly attributed to the 
immaturity of vSphere. However, they are issues which may 
be encountered or may be leveraged as an operating artifact 
for other activities. 
The test topology was as follows:
• A combination of ESX 4.0, ESXi 4.0, and ESX 3.5 
Update 4 infrastructures 
• vCenter was used to manage the clouds resources 
and to instantiate virtual machines
• An NFS share was used as a datastore (hosted by an 
Ubuntu 9.04 workstation)
• A combination of distributed switches and virtual 
switches were used
• A combination of local datastore and NFS datastore 
was used 
• A variety of 64-bit and 32-bit hosts were used 
• A variety of hosts (Windows XP, Windows Vista, 
and Windows 7 with differing service packs, and 
Ubuntu) were used 
During the course of the experiment, the number of hosts 
and the location of the virtual machines changed; however, the 
basic topology remained consistent.
5. pOTeNTIal sOlUTIONs
This section presents potential solutions to some of the 
problems raised in the experiments. We will discuss some areas 
where development can be focused to address the anticipated 
problem. These areas include logging, hypervisor forensics, 
network forensics, and digital forensics on demand (Forensics 
as a Service).
Hypervisor Forensics
The notion of the virtual machine sitting on top of a 
lightweight hypervisor is a relatively new paradigm that 
forensic practitioners are beginning to address. Traditional 
forensic techniques, based on assumptions that the file-
system was directly interacting with the hardware through 
an abstraction, afforded the forensic practitioner the 
ability to assume that there was nothing controlling the 
application below the file-system. This is not the case when 
using virtualized technologies such as Zen or VMware 
products. These hypervisors have the ability to covertly add, 
remove, and/or modify hardware and software on the virtual 
machines on the fly, thus introducing questions concerning 
the validity of data being analyzed on the virtual machine. 
Activities like adding or removing virtual hardware 
would be recognized by the hypervisor but not the virtual 
machine per se, thus necessitating development of a 
hypervisor-level forensic tool (which sits at the hypervisor 
level) for logging, verifying, and storing these changes to the 
virtual machines and archiving the information for use during 
an investigation.
Network Forensics
Network forensics is a subset of digital forensics that 
focuses on collection of network data that may be useful 
as evidence (files that have been transferred, among other 
activities) and the analysis of packets to reconstruct events. 
Network data will play a significant part in cloud computing 
forensics. With the absence of local media to transfer files, the 
network will be one of the only methods to transfer data among 
machines and as such will leave forensic network evidence of 
such transfers. Although the idea sounds simple, the collection, 
preservation, and analysis of network data pose a complicated 
problem. The amount of data generated on the network can be 
more than gigabytes per day. On the Cloud, data generation 
will most certainly be terabytes if not hundreds of terabytes 
per day. The storage capacity necessary to archive this amount 
of data (perhaps for years) is inconceivable. 
Another challenge is the ability to trust the network 
data being received, since the Internet and routing protocols 
are inherently anonymous and much information from the 
packets can be spoofed—such as the MAC address, source 
IP, and destination IP. All are mutable fields that are simple 
to alter. Users can also encrypt traffic using methods such as 
SSH-tunneling. 
Nevertheless, the Cloud provides an entirely new 
venue and a potential wealth of forensic artifacts, although 
formidable challenges face investigators before those artifacts 
are proven valid in the legal arena.
The network forensics principles currently in use are 
the ability to address evidence collection, information storage, 
and retrieval in combination with the attack attribution 
abilities.
Several researchers have published papers on the topic 
of implementing network-based forensic techniques [10; 11; 
12; 13; 14]. However, none of these techniques have been 
implemented in production environments. The researchers 
have identified the inherent ability to use, manipulate, and 
analyze network information that is collected in meaningful 
ways; however, they have not provided methods for conducting 
analysis in real time or on large datasets.
Real-Time Analysis
There is an urgent need to develop smarter, more 
powerful, distributed tools to analyze Cloud data in a real-
time sense. Although strides have been made on tackling the 
network forensic problem, with researchers working in parallel, 
little progress has been made. New strategies and computing 
techniques must be devised to address this issue, maybe even 
using the Cloud itself to analyze the data. Existing tools 
such as Map-Reduce or Hadoop may provide the flexibility, 
modular framework, and computational resources necessary 
to tackle these problems. However, someone must first test 
and vet these tools.
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If a company such as Amazon were to tap or log all the 
traffic coming in and out of its network, an immense amount 
of information could be discerned. (Let us ignore the issues 
with storage and the vast amount of information that will 
be passing through the network.) First, there is an increased 
ability to assign attribution. By looking at the entire set of 
network information, it becomes possible cross-correlate data 
related to who is communicating with whom and what virtual 
machines and files a particular user is transferring to and from 
the Cloud. In addition, there is an increased ability to use the 
file system information between the EC2 time stamping and 
the hashing along with the net flow data to create a stronger 
case for the occurrence of a particular event. Finally, if the data 
have been removed from the virtual machine, thus removing 
any file-system forensics, it is completely reasonable to use 
network dumps to try to reconstruct events.
Due to the ephemeral nature of the data stored on the 
virtual machines, a claim can be made that if the tools were to 
be vetted when moving to the Cloud there will be a stronger 
reliance on network forensic tools. These tools will provide 
not only a historical, imputable record of events but also the 
ability to cross-correlate and begin to address how to gather 
evidence in the cloud. 
6. CONClUsION
During the course of the research described in this paper, 
normal disk forensics techniques were explored that would no 
longer work in the expected manner. Several solutions were 
proposed to this problem. However, the purpose of this paper 
was to bring to light the issues of forensics that would need 
remediation.
It is clear that traditional digital forensics will be 
insufficient as the Cloud grows. Before cloud computing 
becomes more widely accepted, it is essential that we identify 
the emerging challenges and begin to develop solutions or 
mitigation techniques. Such efforts are essential if we hope to 
preserve the basic tenants of computer security.
Piecing together forensic data after the fact from 
distributed sources not intended to be used for that purpose 
would be a frustrating and unsatisfactory process. Tools 
must be developed to ensure that the necessary information 
can be securely collected and remain available if an attack is 
successful.
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